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Summary 
We study the driving forces behind the adoption of environmental innovations (EI) in the 
Italian industry over 2006-2008 through analyses of the new wave of Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS) data that covered for the first time environmental innovation 
adoptions. We investigate whether the first phase of EU ETS has exerted some effects on 
environmental innovations by using a very large sample of italian manufcturing firms. 
Estimates show that external forces and complementarity with other management practices 
are particularly relevant to increase the adoption of relatively new and radical technologies: 
relationships with other firms and institutions, local public funding, group membership are 
the key factors. The role of ETS on EI seems instead to be weak: it drives innovation if we 
compare ETS and non ETS firms, but the stringency itself does not matter, due to sector 
idiosyncratic factors and to the fact that stability of policy also matters. 
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We study the driving forces behind the adoption of environmental
innovations (EI) in the Italian industry over 2006-2008 through analy-
ses of the new wave of Community Innovation Survey (CIS) data that
covered for the ￿rst time environmental innovation adoptions. We in-
vestigate whether the ￿rst phase of EU ETS has exerted some e⁄ects on
environmental innovations by using a bery large sample of italian manufc-
turing ￿rms. Estimates show that external forces and complementarity
with other management practices are particularly relevant to increase the
adoption of relatively new and radical technologies: relationships with
other ￿rms and institutions, local public funding, group membership are
the key factors. The role of ETS on EI seems instead to be weak: it drives
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1innovation if we compare ETS and non ETS ￿rms, but the stringency it-
self does not matter, due to sector idiosincratic factors and to the fact
that stability of policy also matters.
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1 Introduction: environmental innovations and
the European Emission Trading System
The economics and management analyses of environmental innovations (EI her-
after) (Rennings, 2000; Krozer and Nentjes, 2006; Europe Innova, 2008; CML,
2008; Kemp and Pearson, 2007) are based on the evolution of various strands of
empirical research on innovation drivers, and on the theoretical literature regard-
ing the dynamics and environmental and economic performance e⁄ects of EI.
Work on the dynamics of EI has developed within a theoretical literature that
includes classic environmental economics research issues on the static and dy-
namic e¢ ciency of regulatory instruments (economic vs command and control,
￿scal tools and emissions trading) and, thus, the e⁄ects of (technological, mainly
emissions abatement tools) innovation spurred by regulation (Popp, 2002, 2006;
Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; Hahn and Stavins, 1994; Goulder and Parry,
2008; Acemoglu et al., 2011). It also includes analyses evolving within evolu-
tionary economics (Mulder and Van den Bergh, 2001), focused mainly on the
co-evolution of innovation, policy and economic dynamics in socio-bio-economic
systems (Kemp, 1997). The structural theme of endogeneity in innovation is
paramount and links analysis of innovation drivers to work on the e⁄ects of
innovations (Pizer and Popp, 2009; Kemp and Pontoglio, 2011). The empiri-
cal literature is supported by theoretical reasoning testing hypotheses related
to the e¢ ciency (and also e⁄ectiveness, Millock and Nauges, 2006; Bruvoll et
al., 2003) of the economic and policy drivers (Johnstone, 2007). Theoretical
work follows both mainstream and heterodox approaches that deal with ￿rm
and sector innovation performance, as examples of the Schumpeterian tradition
which emphasises ￿ innovation adoption￿and dynamic evolution (Breschi et al.,
2000; Brioschi et al., 2002; Cainelli et al., 2006; 2010; van den Bergh, 2007).
The motivation for environmental innovations (Sterner and Turnheim, 2008;
Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2009; Horbach, 2008; Rennings et al., 2003; Frondel et
al., 2004), and the complementarity between the drivers if innovation (Mohnen
and Roller, 2005; Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2008) and organisational innovations re-
lated to the environment, such as Environmental Management systems (EMS)
and auditing schemes (Harrington et al., 2007; Arimura et al., 2008; Frondel et
al. 2004; Wagner, 2007, 2008; Johnstone and Labonne, 2009) are investigated.
On the level of the economic and environmental performance of EI, the start-
ing point is the Porter (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995; Ambec and Lanoie,
2008; Esty and Porter, 1998) hypothesis related to the competitive advantages,
which, in the long run, may derive from investment in EI (to comply with or
2anticipate environmental policies) or from strategies aimed at not (only) just
cost reduction, but also investment in ￿rm assets in line with the ideals of cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR) (Reinhardt et al., 2008; Margolis et al., 2007;
Benabou and Tirole, 2010). Some aspects of corporate social responsibility
include techno organisational innovations, training or human capital, workers￿
and unions￿involvement in strategic innovation decisions, working conditions re-
lated to health, safety and stress. The aim is to increase long term pro￿tability
through complementary investment in technological and human capital and the
production of impure public goods linked to the innovation process (Kotchen,
2005; Rubbelke and Markandya, 2008).
Research values can be identi￿ed in the various (and new) aspects related
to the synergy and integration of circumscribed analyses of EIs with the larger
conceptual scenario, which at the same time is coherent with the speci￿c fea-
tures of industries in di⁄erent countries (Cole et al., 2005, 2010; Mazzanti and
Montini, 2010). The literature highlights several issues and hypotheses that
need to be tested (Del Rio, 2009; Van den Bergh, 2007) in order to identify the
added value derived from EI analyses (e⁄ects and driving forces). We highlight
some of the most important ones.
Empirical work on the drivers of EI (Horbach, 2008; Horbach and Oltra,
2010) focus mainly on the factors, internal and external to the ￿rm, that can
trigger EI in national or regional systems. It highlights factors ranging from
collaboration to the organisation and relationships of the organisation (Cainelli
et al., 2011a). Another body of work focuses on the co-causal relationships
and complementarities among various typologies of EI (techno, EMS, ISO cer-
ti￿cations, etc (Ziegler and Nogareda, 2009; Wagner, 2008, 2007, 2009, 2003;
Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2008; Cainelli et al., 2011b). Studies using German EI
data assess long run policy e⁄ects (Rennings and Rexhauser, 2010), and point
out that the economic and innovation e⁄ects of policies should include a ￿ polit-
ical economy￿reasoning (Aidt, 2010).
The innovation e⁄ects of the European Union (EU) Emmissions Trading
Scheme (ETS) (Convery, 2009; Ellerman et al., 2010; Cl￿, 2008), a potentially
pathbreaking event in EI dynamics in Europe, has been extensively analysed,
and compared to other environmental policies at the theoretical level (see also
Carraro et al., 2010). However, there has been no robust empirical investigation
of ETS, including its pilot phase in 2005-2007. The studies that do exist provide
some insights, but are based most on case studies and small sample sizes.
At a general level, Borghesi￿ s (2011) conceptual study looks at the e⁄ects of
ETS on innovation and describes ETS allocation and functioning based on past,
current and future scenarios. Kemp (2010) and Kemp and Pontoglio (2011) com-
ment on ETS innovation e⁄ects in their EI related work. These studies refer to
the lack of empirical work and ￿rm level data on innovation and policy although
some micro studies have emerged which try to rebalance the prevalence of macro
based simulation studies focusing on carbon pricing and its economic and en-
vironmental e⁄ects (Alberola et al., 2009, 2008; Tole, 2011). Taschini (2011)
provides a theoretical study on the technological features of ETS developments,
but it relies on simulation analysis. There are also some case based studies that
3include interviews with ￿rm managers; Pontoglio (2010) investigates the paper
and cardboard sector in Italy and ￿nds very weak ETS e⁄ect on EI, and Rogge
et al. (2011) study some German sectors. 1. These authors ￿nd that the innova-
tion impact of the EU ETS has remained limited so far because of the scheme￿ s
initial lack of stringency and predictability and the relatively greater importance
of context factors. Additionally, the impact varies signi￿cantly across technolo-
gies, ￿rms, and innovation dimensions and is most pronounced for research and
development (R&D) on carbon capture technologies and organizational changes.
The analysis in this paper suggests that the EU ETS on its own may not be a
su¢ cient incentive for fundamental changes in corporate innovation activities at
a level that ensures that long-term political targets will be achieved. In a study
that includes 42 interviews with German power sector companies, Rogge and
Ho⁄mann (2010) ￿nd that the EU ETS mainly a⁄ects the rate and direction of
technological change in power generation technologies, in large sized coal-based
power generating companies where carbon capture technologies are added as a
new technological trajectory. Schmidt et al. (2010) conduct a survey of the
innovation e⁄ects of ETS in the EU power sector and conclude that ￿ the EU
ETS has limited e⁄ect on the innovation activities (adoption and R&D) of both
users and producers of power generation technologies. However, the perception
of long-term GHG (greenhouse gas] reduction targets has a signi￿cant in￿ uence
on all innovation dimensions￿ .
Muuls and Martin (2011) provide qualitative and quantitative empirical ev-
idence from interviews with ￿rm managers in six European countries as part
of an extensive study. They ￿nd that 30% of ￿rms joined the ETS, and that
sector di⁄erences outweigh cross country di⁄erences. They provide econometric
evidence of the e⁄ect on innovation adoption of process and product innova-
tions related to ￿ ETS stringency indicators￿ . Their study has some similarities
with our approach and mostly captures current and future stringency (mainly
through expected prices). They use dummy variables for whether the ￿rm is
part or not of the ETS mechanisms. The evidence is mixed. On the one hand,
there seem to be few di⁄erences between ETS and non-ETS ￿rms in terms of
￿ process and product￿types of innovation; on the other hand, the e⁄ect of the
expected stringency of the cap is signi￿cant. This is consistent with early mover
behaviour being not very apparent in the ￿rst phase, and increasing in the cur-
rent phase when ￿rms can anticipate future price rises. The most robust ￿nding
is related to ￿ product and process￿types of innovation, where the stringency of
the ETS in phase III seems to be a driver. This highlights that the choices of
￿rms to engage in R&D and other innovation activities may be related to the
allocation of allowances.
Dechezlepretre and Calel (2011) present a detailed survey of some recent
work on EI. They ￿nd that ￿ some report that the EU ETS has had a strong
positive e⁄ect on low-carbon.. For instance, Petsonk and Cozijnsen (2007) re-
port on a few early case studies and conclude that the EU ETS has had a
1Tomas et al. (2010) analyse the Portuguese chemical sector and ￿nd weak evidence of
increased costs and competitiveness.
4substantial impact on innovation. This is one of the very few studies that
shows an e⁄ect of the ETS on early moving behaviour. Uncertainty about fu-
ture scenarios and price volatility hamper EI. The uncertainty is highlighted by
Gronwald and Ketterer (2011) who study evolution of EU ETS prices, ￿nding
jumps and unexpected movements. This irregular pattern may be generating a
postponement of abatement decisions based on excessive uncertainty.
In a rather pessimistic view of the innovation promoting properties of ETS in
the ￿rst phase, some studies do ￿nd some e⁄ects, although there is no thorough
ex post evaluation. An interesting paper by Di Maria and Jaraite (2011) applies
ex post policy evaluation techniques such as matching estimators to analyse
whether ETS has had an impact in its ￿rst phase. They ￿nd that ETS had no
signi￿cant impact on CO2 emissions (implying lack of impact on innovation).
Anderson et al. (2011), in a survey of Irish ETS ￿rms ￿nd that the scheme has
resulted in moderate technological change, although their study is based on a
small number of ￿rms based in Ireland and Lithuania. Dechezlepretre and Calel
(2011) provide a survey of Belgium, the UK, France and Germany (a total of 233
observations), and ￿nd that ￿rms regulated by EU ETS have innovated more
than unregulated ￿rms, both generally and in relation to low carbon technology.
However, this study uses patents rather than innovation adoption.
What is lacking is a robust econometric study of EU industry. Italy is major
industrial country that provides a good case study. An econometric application
to a large relevant sample should highlight the existence or not of empirical
regularity after controlling for size, sector and the drivers of EI.2
Having said that, the objective of the present paper is in a nutshell to analyse
the innovation e⁄ects of EU ETS ￿rst phase by exploiting the new release of
EU Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 2006-2008, which includes data on EI.
We want to assess the innovation e⁄ects of ETS, highlighting both policy and
sector speci￿c EI e⁄ects. We test the ETS e⁄ect with particular reference to the
start up phase, that is the e⁄ect of the 2005 allocation of quotas on the adoption
of EI over 2006-2008, the period of the ￿fth CIS. This captures potential antic-
ipatory behaviour because the ETS was proposed by the EU Commission over
2000-2002 with a ￿nal 2003 Directive. The allocation procedure gave compe-
tencies to national states as far as sector quota allocation was concerned in the
￿rst phase (Cl￿, 2008; Woerdman et al 2008). This resulted in di⁄erent levels of
stringency depending on the allocated quota and the historical emissions level
in each sector. We use probit and two stage Heckman models to analyse the
probability that ETS triggered EI in 2006-2008. This study contributes to the
literature by providing ￿rm level evidence, which is in line with other work that
uses CIS data, such as Breschi et al. (2000). Sector speci￿city is relevant from
2Rogge et al.￿ s (2011) study concludes that: "As we focused our analysis on the power
sector, other studies will have to identify whether and how the innovation impact of the EU
ETS di⁄ers across sectors. Additionally, all of our case companies were based in Germany
￿ though often with international operations ￿ so it might be useful to investigate whether
companies with other home markets have reacted similarly to the EU ETS [...]. Finally, while
our qualitative approach enabled us to study the complex causal links and feedback loops of
innovation processes in the power sector and how the EU ETS is impacting them, innovation
surveys allowing for statistical generalisations should complement this analysis."
5both innovation (e.g. technological regimes) and policy perspectives. Concep-
tually and empirically, the merging of micro and meso elements enriches the
analysis of sector-related structural forces with micro based heterogeneity and
detail.
The present study is probably the only work on ETS e⁄ects that is based on
CIS survey data, although Aghion et al., (2009) show that ￿ improving energy
e¢ ciency [and] reducing environmental impact or improved health and safety￿
are the lowest ranked motives for innovation. Given that the ETS Directive
was published in 2003, their study can be seen as testing the absence of early
behaviour by ￿rms. However, we test the e⁄ect of ETS implementation in the
pilot phase 2005-2007. The implementation in 2005 and the 2003 Directive are
assumed to have an impact on 2006-2008 innovations. This allows for a time
lag and no overlap between the ￿ policy dose￿and the ￿ innovation response￿ .
The present study contributes to the literature on the drivers of EI, using
national level EI data (CIS 2008 which covers the main EU countries) to test
the innovation e⁄ects of ETS policy. Unlike other survey based studies: (i) we
propose a theoretical framework to show the forces underlying the ￿ di⁄usion of
innovation￿ 3, a typical issue in CIS based studies as opposed to studies focusing
on inventions (Johnstone et al., 2011; Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; Ja⁄e
and Palmer, 1997); (ii) we analyse a very large sample of manufacturing ￿rms.
We thus investigate the drivers of innovation di⁄usion at both theoretical and
empirical levels, with the emphasis on policy related drivers. The focus on
the EU ETS is original and links with and complements recent empirical work
focusing on EU ￿rms using survey based data (Caroli and van Reenen, 2001;
Martin et al., 2011; Muuls and Martin, 2011) to study the link between EI and
managerial and policy factors.
The paper is structured as follows. Paragraph 2 explains the rationale be-
hind the construction of policy stringency ETS related indicators. Paragraph 3
sketches a theoretical model that depicts the innovation choice of ￿rms between
green and brown options. Paragraph 4 presents the econometric analyses of en-
vironmental innovation using CIS 2006-2008 data. Paragraph 5 contains some
concluding remarks on the main results that emerge from the analysis.
2 ETS stringency indicators
We start our investigation by constructing a series of ETS policy indicators
aimed at capturing the stringency of the policy in its ￿rst allocation phase. We
exploit two main sources of information: NAMEA sector emissions data (Tudini
and Vetrella, 2012) released by ISTAT for over 1990-2008 (we exploit 2000-2005
3This conceives EI as a phenomenon driven by ￿rm behaviour and policy levers. To as-
sess the role of policies (ETS), we construct sector level environmental policy indexes (policy
stringency), using data derived from the 2005 allocation of ETS quotas by the Italian Min-
istry of the Environment, and emissions data derived from NAMEA (ISTAT hybrid economic
environmental accounting, see on the topic Costantini et al., 2011 and the recent analysis on
the US by Muller et al., 2011).
6data), and information on the allocation decision derived from o¢ cial documen-
tation from of the Italian Ministry of the Environment (Ministero dell￿ ambiente,
2006).
We employ two measures of stringency, adapted to a sensitivity analysis.
The use of multiple indexes allows di⁄erent perspectives.
The ￿rst indicator is the following:
s1 = T ￿ si ￿ EUAi (1)
where EUAi = tradable permits (European Union Allowances) of sector i;
T = national emission target (Kyoto target: given that we use 2005 as pivotal
year, we have weighted the Italian -6.5% reduction accordingly, thus taking in
the calculation 2/3 of the total target of Italy); si = ei=
P
ej = emission share
of sector i; ei = emissions of sector i;
P
ej = total emissions
The second indicator that can be used as an alternative to the ￿rst one is
the following:
s2 = ei=EUAi (2)
To highlight the connection between the indicators s1 and s2, notice that
the former may also be rewritten as follows:




s1 = EAUi[(T ￿ s2)=
X
ej ￿ 1] (3)
As far as s2 is concerned, we have constructed three alternatives: (i) 2005
NAMEA emissions / allocated quotas, (ii) 2000-2005 average NAMEA emissions
/ allocated quotas (iii) Ministry of the environment reported 2000 emissions /
allocated quotas; (i) is chosen as main indicator.
Concerning s1, we have de￿ned a version taking 2005 as benchmark year
for the Kyoto target (2/3 of total reduction) and a version with the proper
￿nal Kyoto target of -6.5%. Like the other stringency indicator s2, also s1 was
calculated, moreover, taking both NAMEA 2000-2005 average emissions and
the Ministry of the environment emissions.
In the econometric analysis that follows we will run regressions using a
dummy variable that takes value 1 for sectors under the ETS (DE1 ￿paper
and cardboard without printing branch; DF, DI, DJ) and value 0 for all other
sectors. When the dummy takes value 1, we then compute stringency indicators
mentioned above. The use of both the ETS dummy and the stringency indica-
tors among the EI regressors allows to distinguish the impact on the EI deriving
from the presence of the ETS from the e⁄ect generated by the stringency of the
regulation. The values of all stringency indicators by sector are available upon
request. The de￿nition of various indexes is also a way to carry out ￿ sensitivity
tests￿from an empirical point of view, namely observing whether the eventual
signi￿cance is variant or not with respect to the selected index.
3One can reasonably expect that the most polluting sectors show the highest stringency
73 The theoretical model
Let us consider a population of ￿rms whose number is normalised to 1. Each
￿rm has to choose whether: (i) to use an old, polluting technology or (ii) to
shift to a new, pollution-free technology. Let us assume, for the sake of sim-
plicity, that the ￿rm￿ s output and revenues R remain unchanged whatever the
adopted technology. Stated di⁄erently, we assume that in the present context
environmental-innovation consists of a cleaner process technology which does
not imply higher production e¢ ciency (i.e. higher output per unit of input).
Finally, let us assume that the cost of the new, non polluting technology (cNP)
is higher than the cost of the old, polluting technology (cP):
cNP > cP > 0
Each ￿rm has, therefore, to choose between two alternative strategies:
1) keep on using the old technology that requires pollution permits to operate
2) invest in the innovation technology which implies higher costs but sets
the ￿rm free from having to purchase the pollution permits.
Let the variable x(t) denote the share of ￿rms choosing strategy 1 (i.e. that
need pollution permits to operate) at time t, 0 ￿ x(t) ￿ 1.
Indicating with ￿k k = 1;2 the correspondent pay-o⁄s, we have:






￿2 = R ￿ cNP
where: Pp(x) indicates the price of the pollution permits, which is a strictly
increasing function of the number of ￿rms that demand them, QP denotes the
quantity of permits required by the ￿rm that keeps using the old technology to
carry on its activity and
_
Q the amount of emission permits originally received






obviously indicates the amount
of permits sold (when QP <
_
Q) or bought (when QP >
_
Q) by the ￿rm.
The process of adopting strategies is modelled by the so called replicator
dynamics (Weibull, 1995), according to which the strategy whose expected pay-
o⁄s are greater than the average payo⁄ spread within the populations at the
expense of the alternative strategy:
￿
x = x(￿1 ￿ ￿)
where
￿ = x ￿ ￿1 + (1 ￿ x) ￿ ￿2
is the average payo⁄ of the population of ￿rms.
From the equations above, it turns out that the replication dynamics can be
written as follows:
indicators. This seems to be con￿rmed by the available data: as a matter of fact, the most
polluting sector (DI) is besides one case the sector that presents the most stringent allocation
in our dataset, as well as metallurgy, with respect to lower indexes associated with coke &
re￿nery and paper industry.
8￿
x = x(1 ￿ x)(￿1 ￿ ￿2) = x(1 ￿ x)
h














> 0, then the payo⁄ of strat-
egy 1 is higher than that of strategy 2, so that a higher number of ￿rms will
decide to keep on using the old technology (
￿
x > 0). If ￿rms need to buy permits
to use the old technology (i.e. QP >
_
Q),4 this will increase in its turn the price
of pollution permits, thus reducing the gap between the payo⁄s of the two strate-
gies. If, on the contrary,
h






< 0, strategy 2 is more
remunerative than strategy 1. In this case, therefore, a higher number of ￿rms
will shift towards the innovative technology (
￿
x < 0), which decreases the pollu-
tion price. The process will go on as long as
h







until the term between square brackets get to zero, so that each ￿rm is indi⁄erent
between the two alternative strategies.
From the replication dynamics above, it follows that three possible equilibria
can occur in the model, namely the two extreme steady states:
(i) x = 0 in which all ￿rms adopt the innovative technology
(ii) x = 1 in which no ￿rm adopts the innovative technology
and an internal equilibrium in which some ￿rms adopt the new technology
while others keep on using the old technology. More precisely, the latter case
will occur if:






Observe that the internal equilibrium x￿ is a sink (attractor), while the two
extreme equilibria x = 0 and x = 1 are sources (repellors). As a matter of fact,
as it can easily veri￿ed:
if 0 < x < x￿ then
￿
x > 0, while x > x￿ we have
￿
x < 0:
It follows that, whatever the initial share of ￿rms that buy the pollution
permits, the system will always converge towards the stable internal equilibrium
x￿.
The simple analytical framework proposed above can be easily extended to
examine the innovation choices performed at the sector level and their relation-
ship with the stringency indicators introduced in the previous section. Consider,
for instance, a generic sector i that is included in the EU-ETS. Let us assume
that the ratio between emissions level (thus also permits needed QP) and the
permits originally at disposal
_
Q is the same for each ￿rm j belonging to sector
i. If this is the case, it follows that the stringency ratio s2 of the whole sector i
holds for each ￿rm j, namely:
s2 = ei=EUAi = (QP=
_
Q)j 8j
From the equation above, it yields:
QP = s2 ￿
_
Q 8j
4See below for a discussion of the case QP ￿
_
Q.
9Substituting this expression into ￿1, we get:
￿1 = R ￿ cP ￿ Pp(x)
_
Q(s2 ￿ 1)
so that the di⁄erence between the payo⁄s of the two strategies becomes:
￿1 ￿ ￿2 = cNP ￿ cP ￿ Pp(x)
_
Q(s2 ￿ 1)
Notice that if s2 = 1, namely, if each ￿rm originally receives exactly the
amount of permits that are needed to carry on its activity, then the payo⁄
di⁄erential becomes:
￿1 ￿ ￿2 = cNP ￿ cP > 0
In this case, therefore, from the replication dynamics it follows that
￿
x = x(1 ￿ x)(cNP ￿ cP) > 0
In other words, if s2 = 1 strategy 1 will always be more remunerative than
strategy 2 and no ￿rm will innovate at the equilibrium (x￿ = 1).
If s2 < 1, namely, each ￿rm in sector i needs less permits than those at
disposal, then it is:
￿1 ￿ ￿2 = cNP ￿ cP ￿ Pp(x)
_
Q(s2 ￿ 1) > 0 !
￿
x = x(1 ￿ x)(￿1 ￿ ￿2) > 0
Stated di⁄erently, if the ETS is not stringent (s2 < 1) the system will even-
tually converge towards the equilibrium in which no ￿rm innovates (x￿ = 1).
Finally, if the ETS is stringent (s2 > 1), then from the replication dynamics
it yields:
￿
x = x(1 ￿ x)[cNP ￿ cP ￿ Pp(x)
_
Q(s2 ￿ 1)]
which admits both the extreme repulsive equilibria (x￿ = 0 and x￿ = 1) and
the inner attractor x￿ 2 (0;1) in which both strategies coexist.
Observe that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the stringency indicator s2
makes strategy 1 less remunerative with respect to strategy 2. As one would
reasonably expect, it follows that a more stringent ETS will tend to increase
the share of ￿rms that decide to invest in the new non-polluting technology at
the equilibrium.
Given the positive relationship between the stringency indicators s1 and s2
identi￿ed in the previous section, a similar result obviously emerges also if we
measure the ETS stringency in terms of s1. From equation (3), in fact, we can









Substituting the equation above to s2 in the payo⁄ di⁄erential, we get:











It follows that -ceteris paribus- the higher the stringency indicator s1, the
higher the ￿rms￿incentive to innovate (strategy 1 becoming progressively less
remunerative with respect to strategy 2). The same result, moreover, occurs
if the amount of permits at disposal of sector i (EAUi) decreases and/or the
government sets a lower and more restrictive emissions target (T), which is
consistent with what one would reasonably expect.
In what follows we will use the model as a reference to test the ETS e⁄ect
(presence and stringency) on manufacturing ￿rm based innovation, analysing
10the extent to which innovation di⁄usion at ￿rm level is driven by structural
features and policy e⁄ects of sector level.
4 The empirical framework
4.1 The data and the model
In order to analyse the drivers of EI in the Italian manufacturing industry and
test the innovation e⁄ect of ETS, we exploit diverse sources of data. The main
source is represented by the CIS dataset. CIS2008, the 5th wave, was the ￿rst
wave that covered EI adoption in line with the de￿nition of EI developed by
the Measuring EI (MEI) project funded by the European Commission￿ s 6th
Framework Programme (Kemp and Pearson, 2007).5
In order to set de￿ne our ETS policy stringency indicator, we also use
NAMEA emissions data (2005, and 2000-2005 to capture medium run trends)
and the Italian allocation of ETS quotas by sector. The three sets of data were
merged. This is standard procedure when there is an absence of ￿rm level data,
e.g. Cole et al. (2009) merge individual data on wages and ￿rm pollution data
(see also Cainelli et al., 2010). Cluster correction is needed in such cases.
We use dprobit as our estimator tool to study the probability of adoption,
given that our EI variables are speci￿ed as dichotomous indexes. Dprobit ￿ts
with maximum-likelihood probit models and is an alternative to probit. Rather
than reporting the coe¢ cients, dprobit reports the marginal e⁄ects, that is,
changes in the probability of an in￿nitesimal change in each independent, con-
tinuous variable and, by default, reports discrete changes in the probability of
the dummy variables. Tables 1 and 2 provide a brief explanation of the main
dependant variables we test. The appendix reports further specifcations about
the sectors under investigation.
Our econometric model is based on the following probit speci￿cation:
Pr(Yi = 1=X) = ￿(X0￿)
where ￿ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal dis-
tribution and Yi is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if ￿rm i introduces an
EI and 0 otherwise. The full set of covariates described in Table 3.
4.2 Econometric evidence
We present the results for the drivers of EI focusing on the two main speci￿ca-
tions of EI adoption related to the direct e⁄ects of carbon pricing, in our case
ETS: EI related to ￿ reduction in CO2 emissions￿and ￿ energy use per unit of out-
put￿(bene￿ts arising in the production phase). This is the main level at which
we test the hypothesis that ETS stringency eventually can lead to innovation
e⁄ects, given that ETS should be aimed at reducing carbon dioxide emissions
5We thank ISTAT for the provision of data and the possibility to have access to original
sources to carry out estimates. The dataset is highly representative of the italian industrial
system.
11through abatement technologies and/or energy reprocessing and changes to the
energy structure.6.
4.2.1 Environmental innovations for energy e¢ ciency
Tables 4 and 5 present the outcomes for the adoption of EI for energy e¢ -
ciency, which is related to but more extensive than CO2 abatement on which
we comment further below. We describe the internal (e.g. R&D), external to
the ￿rm (e.g. cooperation) and policy correlated factors, including ETS policy
stringency. The rich set of covariates is aimed at mitigating problems of omis-
sion of relevant variables, which, on their own, might produce endogeneity in
cross section environments (we follow the consolidated literature on EI drivers,
Horbach, 2008), although we avoid the inclusion of strongly correlated factors.
In relation to ￿ internal sources￿ , we note that the presence of R&D expen-
diture is never signi￿cant (con￿rming the results in Cainelli et al., 2011a, b
and Horbach and Oltra, 2010). Speci￿c environmental R&D is probably needed
as an input, whereas the lack of signi￿cance of R&D, in our view, is related
to the fact that R&D is ultimately a proxy for general innovative-related ab-
sorptive capacity7. Training activities are positively correlated to EI, which
con￿rms the evidence found in the above cited studies8. Productivity (at 2006
levels), as expected, is a determinant of innovation in the next period: high
performance ￿rms reinforce their advantage through new investment activat-
ing virtuous circles, while less productive ￿rms may experience vicious circles.
This again con￿rms the existence of virtuous circles: EI is driven by positive
core economic performance and may contribute to further enhancing the ￿rm￿ s
economic and environmental performance.
In relation to external sources, we show that they matter a great deal and
provide information on the multiple sources of EI adoption. While innovation
oriented cooperation (CO) does not matter at the aggregate/average level, there
are a number of speci￿c ￿ information sources￿that are relevant for increasing
innovation capabilities and innovation adoption. For example, receiving infor-
mation from other ￿rms in the group (SENTG) is relevant for energy e¢ ciency
and reinforces the advantages of being part of a business group (GROUP). This
is an interesting ￿nding and con￿rms that EI is heavily embedded in network
relationships.
6Further research could exploit EI information on technology adoptions that reduce impacts
at the level of ￿ use of goods￿ : ￿ reduction in energy consumption￿ , ￿ reduced emissions and water
and soil pollution￿ , ￿ Material, waste, water recycling￿ . An extension to the second use oriented
perspective is in line with a life cycle approach that focuses not just on production, but takes
a ￿ from cradle to grave￿view of EI and environmental performance.
7The evolutionary economics and innovation studies literature shows that R&D is often a
factor embodying innovative (absorptive) capacity rather than a strong internal ￿rm e⁄orts
for a comprehensive and environment-speci￿c productivity enhancement. Therefore, it cannot
be a determinant of more radical forms of innovation and performance (Breschi et al., 2000).
8We note that the non signi￿cance of export is coherent with Cainelli et al.￿ s (2011a,b)
￿ndings which also highlight the role played by FDI and foreign ownership among the inter-
national drivers of EI.
12Suppliers are a source of EI (and see also Cainelli et al. 2011a, b) as are
attendance at fairs and conferences.
To achieve consistency with the studies in the literature we include ￿ envi-
ronmental related controls￿in order also to avoid omitting relevant variables.
We ￿nd high signi￿cance for environmental management systems (EMS) intro-
duced before 2006 (we select this form to avoid endogeneity) and sector energy
expenditure per unit of value. Both covariates show positive coe¢ cients for the
correlation with EI, which is a plausible and expected result.
Finally, we investigate the important role of policy variables (ETS). ￿ Public￿
support is necessary for coping with CO2 externalities and ￿rms that receive
public funding are more likely to adopt EI. This applies especially to energy
e¢ ciency, but also applies to CO2 (see below).
The evidence on ETS e⁄ects is mixed. When we test (Table 4) the ETS/non
ETS e⁄ect by including a dummy in the full sample, the coe¢ cient is signi￿cant
and positive. ETS sectors, as expected, are more innovative: they respond to
their structural higher energy intensity and polluting performance by innovating.
The proposal for an ETS system predates the Kyoto Protocol. The Directive
was proposed in 2001-02, and con￿rmed in 2003. At the time of our analysis,
￿rms had had time to behave as early movers and anticipate the policy, The di-
achronic innovation adoption with respect to the ETS Directive and start phase
con￿rms that this EI e⁄ect is dependent on structural factors, but also on the
ETS as a driver of innovation. Further analysis might test for medium long run
e⁄ects; here, the signi￿cance and sign of the dummy is stable and not dependent
on the exclusion/inclusion of additional covariates. It is robust to the inclusion
of two main EI correlated factors, EMAS and sector energy expenditure per
unit of value, both signi￿cant with a positive sign of the coe¢ cient.
The evidence on the e⁄ects of ETS stringency indicators is more counter-
intuitive (Table 5). First, we carry out estimates on the sub sample of ETS
￿rms (four sectors), which includes more than a thousand ￿rms. We ￿nd that
ETS stringency - captured by the proxies described in Section 3 for the sen-
sitivity tests - is negatively correlated with EI. 9. . Looking in more depth
at the ￿ndings, the distribution of EI by sector and inductive evidence from
the interviews with stakeholders (industry association representatives, see also
the Conclusions section), this result is in line with the current situation. The
share of ￿rms adopting energy e¢ ciency EI is higher in the paper and cardboard
(18%), coke and re￿nery (32%), and metallurgy (21%) sectors, while ceramics,
the sector with the strictest ETS allocation based on our indexes, has an EI
adoption rate of 17%. We interpret this as related to idiosyncratic sectoral
weaknesses that a⁄ect management and policy e⁄orts, since ceramics is one of
the most polluting sectors (Marin and Mazzanti, 2011). The econometric ev-
idence should be complemented by case studies and interviews with managers
(Martin et al., 2011). An interview with the body responsible for implement-
ing the ETS in Italy (Con￿ndustria) con￿rmed that the ceramics and cement
9Note also that the proxies implemented give the same econometric result, a sign of ro-
bustness (sensitivity test of the policy index).
13industries have experienced problems in trying to comply with the ETS sys-
tem (see also Martin et al., 2011). These are related on the one hand to the
fragmented structure of these sectors (many small and medium sized ￿rms or-
ganised in districts) and on the other hand to their pollution intensity. Most
￿rms initially aimed only at being compliant by buying and keeping allowances,
and adopted a precautionary approach, including e⁄orts devoted to ￿ lobbying￿
activities (Aidt, 2010). Cooperative (district based) behaviour could compen-
sate for such weaknesses, for example some ceramics districts adopted EMS at
district level to reduce organisational costs. Given the relation between EMS
and EI, integrated approaches to EI within the ETS may be useful. ETS ￿rms
in Italy, on average, are low level EI adopters compared, for example, to ￿rms in
Germany. Thus, the e⁄ect we capture using the ETS stringency indicator, which
is driven by latent structural factors and by di⁄erent capabilities to respond to a
new policy, should be interpreted as marginal. Steel and paper ￿rms are higher
level EI adopters but their share is still low at around 20%. Regarding paper
and cardboard, interviews with managers 10 highlight that in the ￿rst phase
of ETS the e⁄ects on innovation were negligible due to policy uncertainty and
price volatility. This con￿rms other interview related evidence. In addition to
uncertainty, interviewees stressed that SME ￿rms su⁄er from oligopoly market
power and di¢ culties in accessing the market. Evolution of market demand is
recognised as a signi￿cant driver compared to carbon pricing, at least in the
current framework. Interviewees were of the view that more attention should
be devoted to the typology of innovations. Sectors are highly idiosyncratic with
paper producing ￿rms having shifted to gas from oil many years ago and co-
generation occurring in most ￿rms (although not recognised in the ETS scheme).
Also, reuse of sub products improves e¢ ciency. Perhaps funding could target
speci￿c EI in the form of funding and trusts based on the revenue derived from
carbon taxes or ETS non-free allowances (which will apply to future EU ETS
scenarios). A general stimulus to EI through pricing might not be e⁄ective due
to high sector technology idiosyncrasies. It appears that the low price of ETS
has slowed innovation. It is worth noting that some countries, such as the UK,
will support the ETS price through a complementary carbon taxation applied
on top of the ETS pricing system (prices will move from 13£ per tonne in 2013
to 30£ in 2020).Overall, the evidence is mixed. On the one hand ETS ￿rms
are stimulated to innovate on the basis of the structural environmental and the
incentive o⁄ered by the new ETS, and on the other hand stringency does not
matter. Sector structural factors have tended to in￿ uence the path-dependent
patterns among ￿rms. Negative lock in e⁄ects characterise the ceramic sector,
a leading part of the Italian industry with low historical environmental per-
formance. Ceramics ￿rms have reacted by adopting defensive, not innovative
behaviour, buying quotas and ￿ waiting to see￿how ETS develops, but if they
do not increasing their EI generation and adoption e⁄orts, they risk very high
costs as soon as the system becomes more stringent.
10Transcripts of interviews are available upon request.
144.2.2 Environmental innovations for carbon abatement
We next focus on CO2 abatement technology adoption (see Tables 6 and 7). We
highlight the evidence for and against the more general CO2 abatement strategy
of increasing energy e¢ ciency, and the speci￿c action of curbing CO2.
Not that the ￿ information￿ /relational factor is more relevant for CO2 abate-
ment: external sources dominate for relatively more radical types of technology
adoption. External sources of innovation related content and new skills and
competences are important. This is coherent with the ￿ public good￿nature of
CO2 abatement which requires of breakthrough technologies which are beyond
the capabilities of individual ￿rms. The relevance of suppliers as sources of
technology is complemented by the support provided by industry associations
(SPRO).
￿ Public funding support￿has so far been insu¢ cient to encourage decarbon-
isation across the economy. The higher signi￿cance of energy e¢ ciency may
be related to the inadequacy of Italian public policy and prioritisation of more
general objectives such as energy e¢ ciency, and the mixed public good nature of
energy e¢ ciency. Public support could stimulate private investment and higher
￿ appropriation of rents (Corradini et al., 2011). The weaker signi￿cance of CO2
may justify e⁄orts to increase public support.
The results for the set of ￿ environmental￿covariates all have positive and
highly signi￿cant coe¢ cients. The drivers of or factors correlated to EI adoption
seem to di⁄er between CO2 and energy e¢ ciency goals, depending upon the
di⁄erent implications of the ￿ technology adoptions￿ . However, these di⁄erences
highlight the role of external sources of knowledge.11
The restriction on CO2 abatement (Table 7) presents similarities and dif-
ferences in the comparison with ECOEN drivers (Table 5). Again, the set of
stringency indicators is negatively related to EI. Personal contacts with repre-
sentatives of the Italian industry association and a close look at the sector adop-
tion shares for CO2 abatement (18% paper and cardboard, 25% coke and re￿n-
ery, 13% ceramics and cement, 18% metallurgy) highlight that ceramic/cement
￿rms have the most stringent ETS allocation and are the least innovative. The
relatively lower average size of these ￿rms is evidently not counterbalance by
support from networking and ￿ external sources of knowledge￿ . This weakness
should be the focus of policy and management.12 The issue is crucial for both
environmental and economic policy since the ceramics sector is a heavy polluter,
but is also competitive (Costantini et al., 2010). Absence of innovation could
mitigate the possibility to achieve a win win situation (Costantini and Maz-
zanti, 2012). Interviews with managers of ceramics ￿rms highlighted that: the
ETS ￿rst phase did not work to stimulate innovation, although they indicated
that stringent caps might induce greater energy e¢ ciency. In the 1980s, the
ceramics sector introduced some major technological innovations (e.g. new tile
￿ heating procedures￿ ). In the modern ceramics industries, CO2 abatement inno-
11Energy expenditure is not introduced given the high correlation with policy indexes.
12However, this captures the Italian average. For example, in the Emilia Romagna region,
where a core cluster of ceramic district ￿rms operates, EI is higher than the average for Italy.
15vations are more likely in the pre production phase (e.g. new technologies for the
preparation of dust material as input for tiles). Quite interestingly and some-
what counterintuitively, managers in the ceramics and paper sectors indicated
that a carbon tax implemented homogeneously across sectors is more reliable,
less market distorting (fairer for ETS involved ￿rms) and more manageable (by
SMEs).
Finally, in line with the more circumscribed nature of CO2 innovations, the
set of more general signi￿cant factors is reduced (e.g. training and group mem-
bership are no longer correlated with to ECOECO as in the case of ECOEN),
and EMAS is signi￿cant in all the regressions. This is as expected given the
quite radical content of EMAS as an organizational strategy that is correlated
with CO2 abatement decisions in the sub set of ETS sectors. This played a
role before and at the time of ETS introduction (2002-2005). The link between
technological and organizational EI has been assessed robustly in the literature
(Ziegler and Nogareda, 2009; Wagner, 2007,2009).
5 Conclusions
We provide some preliminary micro econometric evidence on the EI e⁄ects of EU
ETS exploiting newly available CIS data for Italian manufacturing ￿rms. We
investigated the policy induced EI e⁄ects of ETS in an usual ￿ innovation func-
tion￿adoption approach that built on (i) a theoretical evolutionary model that
provides a simple analytical framework to analyse what in￿ uences the probabil-
ity of adoption of EI - energy e¢ ciency and CO2 abatement in the production
phase - for ￿rms in the manufacturing sector, and (ii) the related construction
of sector speci￿c ETS stringency indicators,. We extended the set of (typical)
drivers of EI, internal and external to the ￿rm.
Estimates show that EI is driven by a multiple factors, internal and external
to the ￿rm. External forces, that is, knowledge acquisition, seem to matter
most, with some di⁄erences between energy e¢ ciency and CO2 abatement and
the radicalness and content of the innovation. For example, the informed sup-
port of industry associations is relevant for CO2. If on the one hand internal
R&D does not in￿ uence EI, on the other hand sources of EI such as local public
funding, and also less emphasised correlated elements as group membership and
training are key factors. The policy arena, the networking and internal orga-
nizational/management sources direct environmental technical change. This is
new evidence that also con￿rms previous ￿ndings.
In relation to ETS, it seems that its role in promoting innovation is mixed.
Though further econometric and case study evidence is needed to analyse medium
long run innovative reactions (to the development of EU ETS), our ￿ndings show
that ETS is - ceteris paribus ￿one of the drivers of EI for energy e¢ ciency and
CO2 abatement in 2006-2008. Although sectoral structural factors play a role,
this e⁄ect is robust and consistent with the results of other case studies. ETS
has promoted EI. Although this innovation is not necessarily radical in nature
(and our data do not allow is to identify this) we ￿nd that ￿ ETS ￿rms￿adopt
16more EI in the areas of energy e¢ ciency and CO2 abatement.
Within the core set of ETS ￿rms, we see that the stringency of the policy -
produced emissions on received allowances - does not promote more innovation.
In fact, the more the stringency, the lower the level of EI which we interpret
as signalling sector weakness in the speci￿c cases of the ceramics and cement
￿rms. Among the generally low share of ￿rms adopting EI even in polluting
sectors, ceramics demonstrates the lowest innovation intensity. This should be
con￿rmed for other countries, and should be considered by managers and policy
makers.
An interview with the Italian industry association responsible for implemen-
tation of the ETS showed that there is a small impact of policy on innovation
dynamics. Within a framework characterised more by compliance than innova-
tive behaviour in sectors other than the energy sector, ￿rms have adopted ￿ wait
and see￿strategies. Most ￿rms have bought quotas and, so far, tended not to sell
them in the face of uncertainties about targets, mechanisms and prices. Great
e⁄ort has been put into lobbying actions for inclusion in the ￿ free auction￿share
of ￿rms in the new ETS phase. This behaviour is due mostly to the small size
of ￿rms, for example, in the ceramic and paper and cardboard sectors. There
is a need for a collaborative strategy to tackle ETS (e.g. to reduce sunk costs
and information costs), similar to what happened in the case of district based
EMAS implementation. Lack of innovation adoption (di⁄usion) depends mainly
on the structural features of the Italian economy (e.g. SMEs), which increases
uncertainty about future ETS developments. Some features of Italian industry
could mitigate this behaviour, for example, collaboration and pooling of policy
related management costs, including ￿nancial intermediation services.
The pooling of sunk costs might help with the international carbon market,
as clean development mechanisms. Industry associations tend to support those
markets given both the enhanced investments possibility in emerging countries
and the lower carbon abatement prices they would allow to experience. EI
can be promoted and transferred through the formation of international links,
though the resulting lower prices of quotas may be a barrier. The need of an
EU ￿ Linkage Directive￿testimonied this risk. Future work should study the ETS
innovation e⁄ect and include the role of international markets and ￿rm/sector
openness.
Overall, the ￿ndings from work on the role of the EU ETS and evidence
from case studies are con￿rmed by our micro econometric analysis: ETS has
had some e⁄ects on innovation, but we need to disentangle sector structural
e⁄ects that depend on path-dependent innovative patterns and speci￿c isolated
policy e⁄ects. The evidence provided in this paper on ETS is robust from an
econometric view point and refers to a large sample of ￿rms.
Further research could investigate whether subsequent ETS phases produce
more intense EI adoption. This is an urgent issue given that the current al-
lowance price (2011) is 8e (a reduction of 40% since 2010), which is evidence
of uncertainty about future developments. The EU is launching a new energy
Directive on a mixed energy/CO2 tax, which might be aimed also at setting
a ￿ oor to ETS prices. Analysing the second phase of ETS which overlaps the
172008-2009 recession and the fragile, post crisis economic environment, will be
problematic. CIS 2008 was not a⁄ected by the recession, which did not occur till
late that year. The economic and policy dynamics that characterized the ￿rst 5
years of 2000 showed their e⁄ects on EI in 2006-2008. Further research should
test merged Italian and other EU countries￿CIS data to enlarge the datasets
and the set of testable implications. EI for ￿ sustainable consumption￿bene￿ts
could be investigated to understand whether ￿rms have adopted EI to provide
bene￿ts occurring along the life cycle of a product.
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24Table 1 – Distribution of firms by geographic area
ECOEN ECOCO Total
N. % N. % N. %
North-West 478 42,0 365 39,9 2654 40,9
North-East 416 36,5 318 34,8 2188 33,7
Center 128 11,2 107 11,7 839 12,9
South 89 7,8 93 10,2 602 9,3
Islands 28 2,5 32 3,5 200 3,1
Total 1139 100,0 915 100,0 6483 100,0
ECOEN (adoptions of environmental innovations for energy efficiency), 
ECOCO (adoptions of environmental innovations for CO2 abatement)
Table 2 – Distribution of firms by industry 
Manufacturing 
Industry code ECOEN ECOCO Total
N % N % N %
10 70 6,1 62 6,8 467 7,2
11 23 2,0 24 2,6 107 1,7
12 1 0,1 1 0,1 1 0,0
13 49 4,3 41 4,5 305 4,7
14 34 3,0 34 3,7 397 6,1
15 26 2,3 22 2,4 204 3,1
16 53 4,7 41 4,5 339 5,2
17 41 3,6 35 3,8 190 2,9
18 50 4,4 40 4,4 415 6,4
19 18 1,6 14 1,5 56 0,9
20 39 3,4 36 3,9 149 2,3
21 18 1,6 11 1,2 76 1,2
22 79 6,9 52 5,7 445 6,9
23 63 5,5 51 5,6 379 5,8
24 54 4,7 46 5,0 252 3,9
25 131 11,5 89 9,7 736 11,4
26 32 2,8 27 3,0 162 2,5
27 46 4,0 34 3,7 195 3,0
28 100 8,8 88 9,6 458 7,1
29 37 3,2 29 3,2 118 1,8
30 16 1,4 14 1,5 65 1,0
31 56 4,9 43 4,7 283 4,4
32 49 4,3 35 3,8 277 4,3
33 54 4,7 46 5,0 407 6,3
Total 1139 100,0 915 100,0 6483 100,0
See Code reference in the appendix
25Table 3 – Descriptive statistics
Mean Std.Dev
ECOEN  0.175 0.380
ECOCO 0.141 0.348
SENTG (INFORMATION RELATIONSHIPS – ENTERPRISE GROUP) 0.432 0.495
SSUP (INFORMATION RELATIONSHIPS - SUPPLIERS) 0.365 0.481
SCLI (INFORMATION RELATIONSHIPS – CLIENTS) 0.284 0.451
SCOM ( 0.151 0.358
SINS 0.209 0.406
SUNI ((INFORMATION RELATIONSHIPS – UNIVERSITY) 0.078 0.268
SGMT 0.039 0.195
SCON (INFORMATION RELATIONSHIPS – CONFERENCES) 0.214 0.410
SJOU ((INFORMATION RELATIONSHIPS – JOURNALS) 0.144 0.351
SPRO (INFORMATION RELATIONSHIPS –INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION 
SERVICES)
0.125 0.331
CO (INNOVATION RELATED COOPERATION ACTIONS) 0.113 0.317
RTR (TRAINING PROGRAMMES IN THE FIRM) 0.259 0.438
GROUP (MEMBERSHIP TO BUSINESS GROUPS) 0.297 0.457
LPROD06 (LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY IN 2006) 11.881 0.816
RD (R&D PROGRAMMES IN THE FIRM) 0.305 0.460
FUND (PUBLIC FUNDING TO INNOVATION) 0.125 0.331
ETS-STRINGE (FIRM SUBJECT TO ETS)
1 0.248 0.432
LN(EN-EXP) (ENERGY EXPENDITURE PER UNIT OF VALUE) -3.682 0.665
EMAS (PRESENCE OF EMAS BEFORE 2006) 0.154 0.361
1 Detailed information on the continuous policy stringency indexes presented in par.3 and used in table 5 is available 
upon request).
26Table 4 – ECOEN – all industry sectors
Estimation method: 
dprobit
[1] [2] [3] [4]
dx dF / t-value dx dF / t-value dx dF / t-value dx dF / t-value
SENTG 0.035** 2.24 0.035** 2.24 0.034** 2.17 0.032** 2.05
SSUP 0.028** 2.14 0.028** 2.14 0.029** 2.14 0.028** 2.07
SCLI 0.019 1.47 0.019 1.47 0.017 1.36 0.019 1.52
SCOM 0.001 0.17 0.001 0.17 0.001 0.13 0.001 0.09
SINS -0.008 -0.57 -0.008 -0.57 -0.007 -0.52 -0.007 -0.48
SUNI 0.004 0.24 0.004 0.24 0.005 0.27 0.008 0.40
SGMT 0.032 1.24 0.032 1.24 0.029 1.13 0.026 1.02
SCON 0.029* 1.92 0.029* 1.92 0.030** 1.99 0.032** 2.12
SJOU -0.012 -0.78 -0.012 -0.78 -0.014 -0.89 -0.016 -1.00
SPRO 0.015 1.26 0.015 1.26 0.014 1.21 0.018 1.49
CO 0.011 0.58 0.011 0.58 0.011 0.55 0.012 0.59
RTR 0.036*** 3.20 0.036*** 3.20 0.036*** 3.15 0.036*** 3.12
GROUP 0.038*** 3.91 0.038*** 3.91 0.037*** 3.69 0.039*** 3.87
LPROD06 0.023*** 3.19 0.023*** 3.19 0.022*** 3.00 0.022*** 2.93
RD -0.002 -0.26 -0.002 -0.26 -0.003 -0.36 -0.006 -0.60
FUND 0.039*** 3.37 0.039*** 3.37 0.039*** 3.41 0.040*** 3.47
ETS-STRINGE … … 0.054*** 6.81 0.051*** 6.41 … …
EMAS … … … … 0.047*** 3.25 0.046*** 3.17
EN-EXP … … … … … … 2.068*** 108.87
Size dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. obs. 6,483 6,483 6,483 6,483
Pseudo R
2 0.055 0.055 0.057 0.057
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant 10%;
Note: standard errors are clustered at industry level (24 sectors) 
27Table 5 – ECOEN – only ETS industries 
Estimation method: 
dprobit
[1] [2] [3] [4]
dx dF / t-value dx dF / t-value dx dF / t-value dx dF / t-value
SENTG 0.022 1.02 0.022 1.02 0.022 1.02 0.022 1.02
SSUP 0.025* 1.84 0.025* 1.84 0.025* 1.84 0.025* 1.84
SCLI 0.059*** 4.48 0.059*** 4.48 0.059*** 4.48 0.059*** 4.48
SCOM -0.005 -0.15 -0.005 -0.15 -0.005 -0.15 -0.005 -0.15
SINS -0.032 -0.89 -0.032 -0.89 -0.032 -0.89 -0.032 -0.89
SUNI 0.078 1.46 0.078 1.46 0.078 1.46 0.078 1.46
SGMT -0.050 -0.77 -0.050 -0.77 -0.050 -0.77 -0.050 -0.77
SCON 0.078*** 3.19 0.078*** 3.19 0.078*** 3.19 0.078*** 3.19
SJOU -0.025 -1.18 -0.025 -1.18 -0.025 -1.18 -0.025 -1.18
SPRO 0.029 0.79 0.029 0.79 0.029 0.79 0.029 0.79
CO 0.026 0.83 0.026 0.83 0.026 0.83 0.026 0.83
RTR 0.024** 1.97 0.024** 1.97 0.024** 1.97 0.024** 1.97
GROUP 0.033** 2.15 0.033** 2.15 0.033** 2.15 0.033** 2.15
LPROD06 0.022* 1.79 0.022* 1.79 0.022* 1.79 0.022* 1.79
RD -0.003 -0.11 -0.003 -0.11 -0.003 -0.11 -0.003 -0.11
FUND 0.004 0.27 0.004 0.27 0.004 0.27 0.004 0.27
ETS-string-proxy1 -0.014*** -6.76 … … … … … …
ETS-string-proxy2 … … -0.014*** -6.76 … … … …
ETS-string-proxy3 … … … … -0.014*** -6.76 … …
ETS-string-proxy4 … … … … … … -0.013*** -6.76
Emas 0.048 1.56 0.048 1.56 0.048 1.56 0.048 1.56
Industry_code-19 0.070*** 5.33 0.072*** 5.41 0.070*** 5.33 0.072*** 5.42
Industry_code-23 -0.014*** -4.03 -0.014*** -3.98 -0.014*** -4.03 -0.016*** -4.71
Industry_code-24 0.005 0.91 0.005 0.91 0.005 0.91 0.005 0.91
Size dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. obs. 1,613 1,613 1,613 1,613
Pseudo R
2 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant 10%;
Note: standard errors are clustered at industry level (5 sectors) 
28Table 6 – ECOCO – all industry sectors
Estimation method: 
dprobit
[1] [2] [3] [4]
dx dF / t-value dx dF / t-value dx dF / t-value dx dF / t-value
SENTG 0.001 0.13 0.001 0.13 0.0005 0.04 0.003 0.27
SSUP 0.029** 2.30 0.029** 2.30 0.030** 2.34 0.030** 2.33
SCLI 0.009 0.91 0.009 0.91 0.007 0.75 0.006 0.59
SCOM -0.018 -1.59 -0.018 -1.59 -0.018 -1.63 -0.019* -1.67
SINS 0.005 0.39 0.005 0.39 0.006 0.45 0.005 0.37
SUNI -0.005 -0.27 -0.005 -0.27 -0.004 -0.20 -0.001 -0.07
SGMT 0.056** 2.27 0.056** 2.27 0.052** 2.18 0.050** 2.10
SCON 0.036*** 3.41 0.036*** 3.41 0.037*** 3.59 0.039*** 3.75
SJOU -0.026** -1.96 -0.026** -1.96 -0.027** -2.11 -0.028** -2.10
SPRO 0.045*** 3.73 0.045*** 3.73 0.044*** -2.11 0.045*** 3.63
CO 0.003 0.25 0.003 0.25 0.003 0.21 0.003 0.24
RTR 0.028*** 2.67 0.028*** 2.67 0.027*** 2.58 0.026** 2.50
GROUP 0.028** 2.27 0.028** 2.27 0.027** 2.14 0.028** 2.21
LPROD06 0.026*** 4.83 0.026*** 4.83 0.025*** 4.51 0.025*** 4.33
RD 0.018* 1.69 0.018* 1.69 0.017 1.59 0.014 1.34
FUND 0.025* 1.90 0.025* 1.90 0.025** 1.97 0.025** 2.02
ETS-STRINGE … … 0.035*** 3.56 0.031*** 3.12 … …
EMAS … … … … 0.053*** 3.45 0.052*** 3.30
EN-EXP … … … … … … 1.684*** 103.4
Size dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. obs. 6,483 6,483 6,483 6,483
Pseudo R
2 0.059 0.059 0.063 0.063
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant 10%;
Note: standard errors are clustered at industry level (24 sectors) 
29Table 7 – ECOCO – only ETS industries 
Estimation method: 
dprobit
[1] [2] [3] [4]
dx dF / t-value dx dF / t-value dx dF / t-value dx dF / t-value
SENTG -0.020 -1.13 -0.020 -1.13 -0.020 -1.13 -0.020 -1.13
SSUP 0.0003 0.03 0.0003 0.03 0.0003 0.03 0.0003 0.03
SCLI 0.053*** 4.72 0.053*** 4.72 0.053*** 4.72 0.053*** 4.72
SCOM -0.045** -2.34 -0.045** -2.34 -0.045** -2.34 -0.045** -2.34
SINS 0.024 0.66 0.024 0.66 0.024 0.66 0.024 0.66
SUNI 0.028 0.79 0.028 0.79 0.028 0.79 0.028 0.79
SGMT 0.043 0.63 0.043 0.63 0.043 0.63 0.043 0.63
SCON 0.064*** 3.56 0.064*** 3.56 0.064*** 3.56 0.064*** 3.56
SJOU -0.036 -1.57 -0.036 -1.57 -0.036 -1.57 -0.036 -1.57
SPRO 0.059** 2.17 0.059** 2.17 0.059** 2.17 0.059** 2.17
CO 0.003 0.17 0.003 0.17 0.003 0.17 0.003 0.17
RTR 0.025 1.62 0.025 1.62 0.025 1.62 0.025 1.62
GROUP 0.001 0.07 0.001 0.07 0.001 0.07 0.001 0.07
LPROD06 0.030*** 4.18 0.030*** 4.18 0.030*** 4.18 0.030*** 4.18
RD 0.022 0.095 0.022 0.95 0.022 0.95 0.022 0.95
FUND -0.021 -0.94 -0.021 -0.94 -0.021 -0.94 -0.021 -0.94
ETS-string-proxy1 -0.025*** -5.35 … … … … … …
ETS-string-proxy2 … … -0.025*** -5.35 … … … …
ETS-string-proxy3 … … … … -0.025*** -5.35 … …
ETS-string-proxy4 … … … … … … -0.023*** -5.35
Emas 0.081** 1.97 0.081** 1.97 0.081** 1.97 0.081** 1.97
Industry_code-19 0.002 0.43 0.004 0.70 0.002 0.43 0.004 0.72
Industry_code-23 0.020*** 4.77 0.020*** 4.81 0.020*** 4.77 0.017*** 4.22
Industry_code-24 0.013 1.50 0.013 1.50 0.013 1.50 0.013 1.50
Size dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. obs. 1,613 1,613 1,613 1,613
Pseudo R
2 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant 10%;
Note: standard errors are clustered at industry level (5 sectors) 
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